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Remarks by the Moderator, Virginia Weldon 
The Center for the Study of American Business welcomes all 
of you this afternoon to what we believe will be an interesting de-
bate on the role of federal regulation and how it affects our free-
market economy. We are probably past the point of a debate about 
being for or against regulation. We're really down to, "How much 
regulation?" and "How do we make it work in a reasonable way?" 
Our two debaters bring decidedly different perspectives to this 
issue, but who knows what the outcome will be-they may even 
agree on some substantive suggestions that might lead to major 
public policy reforms. We'll see. 
First, let me introduce our visitor. Carol Tucker Foreman of 
W:tshington, D.C. is no stranger to Washington University. Shere-
ceived her degree in political science from Washington University 
and has served as a member of its Board of Trustees. In 1978, she 
received the Washington University Distinguished Alumni Award. 
From 1973 to 1977, Carol was executive director of the Consumer 
Federation of America, where she became a lead spokesperson for 
consumers on food issues. From 1977 to 1981, she served as assis-
tant secretary of agriculture for food and consumer services and 
became the lead administration advocate for consumers on food 
issues. She led the development of the first dietary guidelines for 
Americans, and strengthened the Women's, Infant, and Children's 
Supplemental Feeding Program known as WIC. In 1981, she formed 
her own consulting firm and has been president of Foreman 
Heidepriem & Mager Inc. until last month, when she left the firm 
to rejoin the Consumer Federation of America as distinguished 
fellow and director of CFA's new Food Policy Institute. It's a great 
pleasure to welcome Carol back to her alma mater. 
Murray Weidenbaum almost needs no introduction to this 
audience. He is the Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Profes-
sor of Economics and founder and chairman of the Center for the 
Study of American Business. In 1981-82, he served as chairman of 
the Council of Economic Advisers to President Ronald Reagan. He 
also was a member of the President's Economic Policy Advisory Board 
from 1982 to 1989. He served as assistant secretary of the treasury 
for economic policy to President Richard Nixon. Earlier in his ca-
reer he was chief economist for Boeing. Constantly on the go, and a 
prolific contributor to journals and writer of op-ed pieces, Murray 
has recently been appointed to the bipartisan Trade Deficit Review 
Commission at the recommendation of Senator Trent Lott and was 
also the project director for the Committee for Economic 
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Development's report entitled, "Modernizing Government Regula-
tion: The Need for Action." 
So now you know a bit about our two debaters; let's get on with 
it. Here are the ground rules. Each will have a maximum of 10 
minutes for opening comments, followed by five minutes each for 
rebuttal. We'll decide who will go first by a coin toss. Following their 
opening comments and rebuttals, the two debaters will have an 
opportunity to question each other and to take questions from the 
audience. Each response will be limited to two minutes. Each de-
bater will be allowed five minutes for summation, and then I will 
try to determine if there are any common threads that might lead 
to substantive recommendations for regulatory reform. 
[Foreman won the coin toss and opted to follow Weidenbaum.] 
Opening Comments 
Weidenbaum: To put it simply but accurately, business and 
government need each other. Without government there is anar-
chy. Without private enterprise there is poverty. However, the re-
lationship between these two basic components of a modern society 
is usually uneasy, and often adversarial. 
The range of interaction between business and government 
is complex. The same government that is the unfriendly regulator 
and tax collector is also the most welcome customer and provider of 
subsidy and credit. The relationship between business and govern-
ment is uneven. The largest company cannot raise taxes or throw 
you in jail. The smallest unit of government can. 
A central issue facing any modern society is how to deal con-
structively with the dynamic tension between the public sector and 
the private sector. Government sets the rules that are so essential 
for a private enterprise system-enforcing private property rights 
and business contracts-and establishing money itself. 
In turn, business creates the jobs, income, and goods and ser-
vices that are at the heart of the economy and that generate the 
revenues to finance government. The competitive forces in the 
marketplace are key to a free society. It is a remarkable unifor-
mity of history that no collectivized economy has ever produced a 
single free election or a free press. 
The continuing challenge is how to constructively harness 
the innovative power and motivating incentive of the business 
enterprise so that it meets society's needs without weakening 
business's unique characteristics that are at the heart of a free 
society. That is a difficult task under the best of circumstances. 
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Given the emotional nature of most debates on business-govern-
ment relations, we should try to raise the information level, not 
the decibel level. 
To get the discussion going, I offer a set of questions. They 
may seem to be loaded questions-and they are. My purpose is to 
get the policy debate to deal with real and tough issues. 
1. Should the government regulate everything? The scope of regu-
lation is constantly expanding. The rationale for compulsory hel-
met laws for motorcyclists could extend to controlling the diets of 
badly overweight people. Both impose heavy medical costs on soci-
ety. That is the reasoning in support of helmet laws. 
2. Haven't we exceeded the limits of sensible regulation? For ex-
ample, smelly old clunkers represent the bulk of the pollution gen-
erated by autos. Yet public policy requires making new cars even 
more expensive, encouraging people to hold on to those clunkers 
longer. Worse yet, the much lighter cars that meet energy effi-
ciency standards are far less safe to drive. 
The relationship between business and government is 
uneven. The largest company cannot raise taxes or 
throw you in jail. The smallest unit of government can. 
-Weidenbaum 
Perhaps the biggest problem is that Congress does not know 
how to legislate common sense on the part of the regulatory agencies. 
• EPA's air standards assume an individual lives 218.7 
yards from the source of air pollution and never leaves 
the spot. She stays outdoors for 70 consecutive years with-
out ever going indoors. 
• EPA's water pollution standards assume an individual 
drinks 2.1 quarts of contaminated water every day for 70 
consecutive years. 
• The regulators are in the process of requiring every bank 
to report to the government any time an individual var-
ies from his or her "normal" banking habits. That's really 
scary. It could cover every graduating senior who gets a 
full-time job. 
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3. Does it make sense for regulation to focus almost exclusively 
on business? OSHA-the workplace regulator that is business's fa-
vorite four-letter word-places no responsibility on employees-even 
when their actions endanger other employees. Important EPA laws 
exempt government agencies and nonprofit institutions, no mat-
ter how much they pollute. Federal highway safety legislation regu-
lates car manufacturing in excruciating detail. But the Feds ignore 
the role of drunk drivers and drunk pedestrians-even though they 
account for most highway fatalities. It is easier to regulate busi-
ness than to deal with the problems directly. 
4. Reforming regulation isn't necessarily a trade-offbetween dol-
lars and lives. The most current example is the compulsory air bag. 
It kills children and small women. Supposedly, the air bags save 
large adults-but only if they don't already buckle up. Yet the crit-
ics of regulation get lambasted for supposedly caring more for dol-
lars than for people. 
What's the answer? We need to reconcile economic concerns 
Uobs, competitiveness, and profits) with social concerns (environ-
ment, health, and safety). Policymakers keep them in separate 
compartments, but shouldn't. For example, many federal tax and 
expenditure subsidies supposedly help some sector of the economy, 
but they mess up the environment. In turn, the typical environ-
mental statute prohibits taking account of economic factors and 
thus it may take the least efficient and most costly approach in 
reaching its objectives. 
Foreman: In a complex, technologically advanced society, gov-
ernment establishes the rules needed to protect public health and 
safety, assure fair markets and promote the general welfare. 
In our representative democracy, the rules evolve from a con-
stant tugging and shoving and balancing of competing interests 
and conflicting values. Economic efficiency is one of those values. 
Market mechanisms have served our nation very well, and Ameri-
cans have a justifiable fondness for them. But surely the founding 
fathers were stirred by a vision of something more than generat-
ing the greatest output for the least input and, from the beginning 
of the nation, Americans have consistently put basic social values 
including equity, safety, and public health above the market. The 
regulatory process is one of the tools we have developed to allow us 
to enjoy the benefits of market capitalism while managing the 
undesirable consequences of the single-minded pursuit of profit. 
Critics of federal regulation charge that too often rules are 
constructed by legislators and regulators who are oblivious to mar-
ket necessity and too beholden to a fickle electorate. And the rules 
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themselves impose irrational, unreasonable burdens on business. 
There are three serious weaknesses in that argument. 
First, as one who has labored as a lobbyist for many years, 
getting a bill through Congress and signed by the president is no 
easy task. It requires massing enough data and public support to 
overcome the many institutional barriers to action. Many would 
argue that, in fact, our system of checks and balances causes the 
U.S. government to be too slow in addressing the problems gener-
ated by a technologically sophisticated world. 
Second, far from being disadvantaged by the decision-making 
process in Washington, corporate America, with its lobbying bud-
gets and campaign contributions, has the tools and the access to 
influence government decision making. 
Third, examine the range of federal regulation. You will find 
that American business spends much of that influence seeking 
not to reduce federal regulation, but to maintain and even increase it. 
Surely the founding fathers were stirred by a vision of 
something more than generating the greatest output for 
the least input, and Americans have consistently put 
basic social values ... above the market. 
-Foreman 
Let me note a few examples. New Deal-era economic regula-
tion provided a nice, comfortable, competition-free ni~he for truck-
ers, airlines, and railroads. They held on to the1r regulatory 
protection long after there was much public v~lue to t~e rate- ~d 
route-setting of the ICC and the CAB. Econom1c regulat10n restnct-
ing markets still thrives. Banks have spent mi.llions .of dollars lob-
bying to keep securities companies out of the1r bus1ness. Peanut, 
sugar, and dairy farmers fight fiercely to keep government regula-
tors allocating markets and setting prices for their products. 
Today, the debate centers on social, not economic, regulation. 
Economists conservative commentators, and think tank leaders 
argue that 'health, environmental, and civil rights regulation is 
strangling the market and must be pared back. Fortunately, the 
markets just keep ignoring their dire predictions. We meet here 
one day after the Dow reached a rather important milestone. 
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The argument that regulation throttles growth is further un-
dermined by the constant efforts of business leaders to stay under 
the yoke of federal control. 
For example, to assure that meat and poultry labels are accu-
rate, USDA regulations require a company representative to ap-
pear at the Department to have the label examined and approved. 
Vice President Gore's "reinventing government" project suggested 
ending the practice and cutting back on the rigid control over la-
bels. Consumer advocates didn't object, but some regulated compa-
nies did. They feared their competitors would cheat. And companies 
that sell label "expediting" services to the industry not only objected, 
they got a court injunction to prevent the change. 
If the Food and Drug Administration didn't exist, food compa-
nies would be forced to invent it. Without FDA's assurance of its 
safety, cheese and yogurt makers would never have bought milk 
from cows treated with Monsanto's recombinant bovine growth 
hormone. 
The primary legislative goal of the Grocery Manufacturers of 
America this year is to expand the reach of federal regulation. The 
GMA wants Congress to expand federal authority over the food in-
dustry, to pre-empt state action regulating food safety and labeling. 
Does that surprise you? It shouldn't. Business frequently prefers 
federal regulation to state because, in the pithy words of one trade 
association executive, "I'd rather be regulated by one federal go-
rilla than fifty state monkeys." 
The inconsistency of the anti-regulation forces doesn't stop 
there. Leading opponents of regulation, including some running 
for president of the U.S., want federal regulators out of the board-
room, but favor moving them into our bedrooms. They want federal 
regulations to govern medical decisions between a woman and her 
doctor about whether to end a pregnancy, and to limit sexual prac-
tices between consenting adults. Does anyone think a cost-benefit 
analysis would contribute anything worthwhile to those debates? 
Business leaders and social conservatives decry federal regulation 
in theory, but drink from the cup of federal power when it is conve-
nient to do so. 
It's almost impossible to find anyone who is unabashedly pro-
government regulation. Most of us are ambivalent about it at best. 
We'd like to get rid of the regulations that protect the other guy and 
keep the ones that protect our own interests. As one wise partici-
pant in the process once stated, "When it comes to regulation, where 
you stand depends upon where you sit." 
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Rebuttals 
Weidenbaum: Thank you. That was very interesting, because 
Carol is often right and often wrong. Let me disentangle that. 
She's absolutely right-Congress devotes a lot of time and 
energy before it passes a law to try to make sure that there's 
really a compelling need for it. But examine that Congressional 
process carefully. Overwhelmingly, maybe 80-90 percent of the 
time and effort is devoted to hearings on the nature of the prob-
lem. The solution, the actual law establishing the regulatory 
regime, gets rushed through with very little attention from the 
Congress. Typically the staff is still preparing it when the Con-
gress votes the bill. That staggers the imagination, but it's true. 
A copy of the Clean Air Act, for example, wasn't available to the 
members of the Congress when they had to vote yes or no on it. And 
I don't mean to pick on that-the same is true with every major tax 
bill. But it helps explain the shortcomings of the actuality of 
government. 
I don't think that the proper, sensible, desirable way of 
looking at government regulation is from a viewpoint 
of government or of business .... The proper way is to 
look at the whole phenomenon of government, and 
especially government regulation, from the viewpoint 
ofthe consumer. -Weidenbaum 
Yes, Carol is right-many businesses get so used to regula-
tion that they use it to keep out new competition. Exactly! That's 
one of the shortcomings that economists constantly cite as a key 
reason for reducing the array of government regulation. That's not 
an excuse to keep the regulation. 
But there is a red herring I really want to object to. Whatever 
your view of government in the bedroom is-and I have a hunch 
that Carol and I are rather close on that one-thaes irrelevant to 
the subject of government regulation of business. If it's not a red 
herring, it's like my shirt, blushing pink. 
I don't think that the proper, sensible, desirable way of looking 
at government regulation is from a viewpoint of government or of 
business. In a sense both are middlemen or middlewomen. The 
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proper way is to look at the whole phenomenon of government, and 
especially government regulation, from the viewpoint of the consumer. 
And here the consumer bears the burden of government regula-
tion in terms of higher costs, reduced variety of products, as well as 
getting whatever benefits there are from government regulation. 
But that's the proper way of looking at it: "Is the consumer 
better off or worse off from a given government regulation?" Not: 
"Do you care about clean air? Do you care about a safe work-
place?" We all do. The difficult question-that's why I raised some 
of those loaded questions earlier-the real serious concern is, 
on balance, is this specific government intervention you're talk-
ing about helpful or hurtful to the average citizen, to the aver-
age taxpayer? That's the question that is avoided in most of the 
debates, unfortunately, and avoided on both sides. Even if it's a 
boon to business, if it's a bane to the consumer, we ought to 
oppose it. Not that we oppose clean air or clean water, but we 
oppose the specific bureaucratic intervention, in a sense say-
ing to the Congress and to the regulators, "Back to the showers. 
This doesn't hack it. Take another stab at it." 
And let me say finally, there's a limit to the amount of activity 
that government can sensibly perform. You take a look at the thou-
sands of pages-the library-that is filled by all of the statutes and 
regulations issued by government. Common sense tells you that 
even if the government were staffed by Newtons and Einsteins, 
they couldn't sensibly carry out that whole array. To get down to it, 
there's a case for economizing-not eliminating-economizing on 
government regulation. 
Weldon: Carol? 
Foreman: Thank you. My friend Murray argues in his re-
cent essay on regulatory reform that regulation impairs eco-
nomic growth. On the way out here this morning, I remembered 
that Missourians kind of like newspapers as props. I couldn't 
find the Harry Truman Chicago Tribune, but I thought maybe I'd 
bring this morning's Wall Street Journal. It proclaims that yester-
day the Dow passed 10,000 for the first time in history. 
Government regulation has frequently stimulated innovation 
and the development of new products. Until recently, the Depart-
ment of Agriculture argued that it didn't have the authority to regu-
late the presence of pathogens in raw meat and poultry. The result: 
There were no tests for discovering the presence of those patho-
gens. In the couple of years since the Department began to regu-
late them, there's been an enormous amount of technology transfer 
and a whole raft of new tests to detect the existence of these patho-
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gens and improve public health protection. 
I think it is wonderful Murray is in his "on the one hand, ... on 
the other hand" mode today. On the one hand he argues that 
government's gone too far in regulating individual behavior, for 
example the helmet laws. But then he suggests that perhaps it 
would be more appropriate to take the burden of highway safety off 
of the automobile manufacturers and put more of it onto the drunk 
drivers and drunk pedestrians who are responsible for most of the 
traffic fatalities. I'm not sure where he goes on that. One of the 
reasons, incidentally, that the federal government does regulate 
highway safety and ignores the problem of drunk driving and drunk 
pedestrians is that the states regulate those areas. It hasn't been 
determined to be interstate commerce. Last year, however, in the 
Congress, there was an effort to try to influence the states and get 
them to be a little more vigilant about drunk drivers by attaching 
strings on the highway trust fund and encouraging states to lower 
the blood alcohol that qualified you as being under the influence. It 
went down to defeat because the alcohol industry and conserva-
tives in the Congress argued that this would be an inappropriate 
new expansion of federal regulatory power. 
Government regulation has frequently stimulated 
innovation and the development of new products. 
-Foreman 
The banking regulation that Murray mentioned is an inter-
esting one. It was proposed, but withdrawn. It was not the idea of 
social regulation advocates but of conservatives, the Drug Enforce-
ment Agency, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. 
They wanted the banks to keep these records in order to help keep 
tabs on organized crime and drug dealers. 
The most important difference between Murray and me-and 
it's one that I'll come back to in my recommendations-is deter-
mining when something is the fault of regulators and when it is 
because a law has been badly drafted by the Congress. Murray made 
reference to that in his comments on the EPA and the tax laws. But 
it's not often that critics of regulation are as precise as he was in 
making that criticism. In his recent paper, Murray criticizes the 
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Department of Agriculture for continuing to look at every one of the 
4 billion chickens that are slaughtered each year. It is a silly thing. 
But it continues because the meat industry does not support chang-
ing the archaic law that requires it. 
Questions from the Floor 
Weldon: Thanks, Carol. Well, you've heard from our two de-
baters now, and you've heard their rebuttals. There will now be an 
opportunity to take questions from the audience directed to one or 
both. Each will have approximately two minutes to respond to your 
questions. The two debaters can also question each other, and I have 
a few questions in case we don't have enough from the audience. 
Question 1: Dwight Lee, adjunct fellow with the Center for the Study 
of American Business. I would argue that business often fights for 
regulation, but what they're really doing is fighting against the most 
effective type of regulation. It seems to me many of the business 
attempts to get regulated, as you pointed out, are attempts to pro-
tect themselves against competition and the forces of the market, 
which I think provides much more effective regulation in many 
cases than many of the regulatory advocates think or believe, and 
businesses are trying to get out from under that regulation by get-
ting tariffs or getting other forms of regulation like the CAB-truck-
ing-to eliminate or reduce the competition. 
Foreman: Clearly businesses go for economic regulation in 
order to protect themselves against the weaknesses of the market. 
A vigorous antitrust regulatory system, in my view, is the best way 
to go after that problem. Sometimes it requires weaning businesses 
that have been dependent upon federal regulation for a long time. 
One of the reasons that I oppose the regulatory budget is that it 
says, "This is the amount of money that we'll have for regulation" 
and makes no effort to differentiate between the billion dollars a 
year cost of looking at every fool chicken slaughtered and another 
regulation that could pass anybody's test for preserving life and 
health in a modern society. 
Weidenbaum: I'd like to point out that, with an awful lot of 
regulation, the statute initially is enacted over the objection of 
business. But of course business adheres to it once it becomes 
law-learns to live with it, and then, yes, often becomes an enthu-
siastic defender of the regulation to keep out new competition. 
That's just the normal process of adjusting to some dumb law that 
shouldn't have been enacted in the first place. 
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Question 2: Leonard Guarria, World Agricultural Forum. You've cor-
rectly noted that regulation and business have a special rela-
tionship. But it's much more complex, it would seem to me now, 
in the international arena. Regulation is often proposed by gov-
ernments against other governments or their industries. I'd like 
to hear your views on regulation in an international sense. 
Weidenbaum: It's always difficult to generalize in such an 
array of regulation, but so much of the current emphasis on 
international regulation is designed, as I can see it, to be a 
trade barrier, to protect. An example: The European Union is 
using regulation in lieu of tariffs. Tariff increases will run afoul 
of the World Trade Organization agreement, so therefore they 
are using a second-best alternative, health and safety regula-
tions, although it seems clear the concern isn't health or sa~ety 
but the financial health of the producers in the European Union. 
And the health and safety regulations are in effect a loophole 
used to restrict international commerce. I think that's a very 
undesirable development. In fact, if we went back to the early 
regime when we had tariffs, it wouldn't be as bad because tariffs 
operate through the price system. You cut costs enough, you 
can absorb the tariffs and still compete. But if you have an abso-
lute prohibition through a regulatory barrier, you're out of the 
picture. Competition is reduced. I think that's something we 
ought to worry a great deal about and learn more about. 
Foreman: I ought to go back to Washington and say Murray 
Weidenbaum wants to go back to Smoot-Hawley! 
Weidenbaum: That's a good line! 
Foreman: And I agree with him. Clearly it's being used as a 
non-tariff barrier. On the other hand, we're in a new era here, and 
you can't disregard the need for reasonable health and safety legis-
lation and regulation in the United States because some other coun-
try might decide to challenge it as a non-t.ariff bar~ier. 
There is an interesting piece of business going on between 
the Australian government and the U.S. government over 
Australia's changes in their meat inspection system. Our gov-
ernment instead of fighting it fiercely, is using it to help con-
struct a ~hange that will help build the case for moderniz~ng the 
U.S. inspection law. The USDA has pushed the Australians to 
defend each of the changes they've made and to show they meet 
the U.S.-set performance standards for reductions o~ pathoge~s 
in raw meat. That, I think, is a model that we might use In 
other instances. But don't hold your breath until the Europeans 
decide to apply it to hormones and BST. 
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Question 3: Clarence C. Barksdale, Trustee of Washington University. 
I just want to make a comment and then maybe direct a question. 
You gave the example of the inspection of the chickens, and Murray 
talked about the banking business. I know a little bit about the 
latter. In these cases I think these companies have used these as 
marketing opportunities. You definitely don't want to sell a chicken 
unless it's stamped "government inspected." And you definitely don't 
want to be in the banking business unless it says "insured by the 
FDIC"-at least I wouldn't want to be today. These are old regula-
tions, and I think these are examples that businesses have learned 
to live with them. We haven't been given the choice of living with-
out them. I would say that the banking business would probably like 
to, but with 50 or 60 years of regulation, it's hard to market in an 
environment without having that stamp of approval. So I think the 
biggest challenge to the problem is these newer regulations that are 
coming out-how do they become more flexible? As I said, the old 
regulated companies get used to it. But I think the example of the air 
bag is a great one, where we see it may not be a great safety device 
now-it may be a detriment. How do we get that changed? 
What we need ... is not to go at this straw thing out 
there, but to go at regulations individually and substan-
tively and see if each one meets the particular needs 
that it was designed to attack. If it doesn't, let it go. 
-Foreman 
Foreman: Let me respond quickly. Unfortunately, "flexible" 
usually means that the industry has learned not only to live with 
it, but has managed to turn it to its advantage through the applica-
tion of the economic power that comes from lobbying and campaign 
contributions. If you attack specific regulations as being poorly writ-
ten or not being backed up by adequate data, I'm prepared to walk 
through the process, and if the regulation doesn't measure up, let's 
get rid of it. But don't attack regulation nonspecifically, as though 
it were some toxic cloud. In the end, we all have regulations we 
like, and we want to keep those. And we have regulations we don't 
like, and we don't want to keep those. 
What we need, if we want to be productive about this, is not to 
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go at this straw thing out there, but to go at regulations individu-
ally and substantively and see if each one meets the particular 
needs that it was designed to attack. If it doesn't, let it go. I find 
that every time we talk about this, there is this great Mammon 
"regulation." I don't think you can sustain that argument. 
Weidenbaum: Let me take a twist to that one. A number of 
years ago our Center for the Study of American Business issued a 
nonpartisan inventory of government regulation-just inventory-
ing. I think it was just one page for each regulatory program. Even 
though it was many years ago, that was a big fat book. I used to be 
fascinated watching people turn pages on this, whether they were 
workers, employers, consumers, retired people, students, faculty, 
liberals, conservatives, independents-it didn't matter. They'd wind 
up shaking their heads: "The Feds are regulating this?" They'd 
turn some more pages: "The Feds are regulating that?" Before they'd 
finish, they'd usually wind up with some comment like, "My good-
ness! The Feds are trying to regulate everything!" 
To put it mildly, Congress has assigned more regulatory 
tasks to the government than it's feasible to carry out with 
any degree of efficiency . ... You have to choose what's 
really important, and Congress has never done that. 
-Weidenbaum 
I suggest it's a real eye opener to sit down and go through the 
array of government regulation of business. To put it mildly, Con-
gress has assigned more regulatory tasks to the government than 
it's feasible to carry out with any degree of efficiency. It's a ques-
tion of priority. You have to choose what's really important, and 
Congress has never done that. They examine each regulatory stat-
ute in isolation, as if Congress and the government don't regulate 
anything else. It's a way of thinking that has to be changed. But as 
I say, you have to go back to the birth stage of government regula-
tion, and that birth stage usually is, if you attend those congres-
sional hearings, very emotional testimony on the shortcomings of 
the status quo and why the government needs to intervene. And 
that, unfortunately, so distorts the process that what comes out is 
the nonsense I was talking about. 
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Foreman: Wait a minute. If you hold a hearing because 9,000 
people a year are dying from foodborne illness, and we clearly have 
a system that's not attacking that adequately, that's nonsense? 
Weidenbaum: The nonsense, Carol, is not the complaints 
about the problem. The nonsense is the hastily written and en-
acted response. That's the problem. I think it's just plain wrong. 
Foreman: Well, the last time they amended that law was 196 7 . 
Weidenbaum: The fact that they didn't have a copy of the BOO-
page Clean Air Act when they voted on it, I think it's awful-
especially when you sit down and try turning pages on that. I served 
on the Clean Air Act advisory committee at the EPA for a number of 
years. That was an eye opener. Look at all of the provisions of the 
Clean Air Act that EPA was supposed to carry out. They couldn't. 
And of course a lot of environmental organizations had a lot of fun 
suing the bejesus out of EPA for not carrying out the 800 pages of 
requirements when they knew when the bill was being voted on 
there was no way that all of those requirements could feasibly be 
carried out. 
Foreman: And I would argue that that's a problem with a spe-
cific law, not a problem with regulation generically. If you end up 
with a regulatory budget in which you, as you did, list all of the 
regulations, and say we're going to get rid of 10 percent of them 
next year, the ones that will end up staying are the ones that 
everybody's most comfortable with because they've been around 
the longest time. And the ones that will end up going are the ones 
that address the problems that we confront today as our society 
changes-the problems that come about from increasing air pollu-
tion, the problems that come about from women trying to be in the 
workforce on an equal footing. And it seems to me the solution is to 
write a better law, not to say we are going to deal with regulation 
qua regulation and do away with it. 
Weldon: Things are beginning to get exciting here! This is 
getting a little bit like Crossfire now. 
Foreman: Oh, no, come on! We'd never sink to that. 
Weidenbaum: The regulatory budget that Carol Foreman 
has just described is awful. I'd vote against it if I had the oppor-
tunity. Let me describe my version of the regulatory budget-
it's very different. 
The first step is to know the magnitude of resources-we do 
that in dollars, typically-that is devoted to carrying out govern-
ment regulation. Depending on the estimates, it's 400, 500, 600, 
700 billion dollars. There are arguments for each of these num-
bers, but each of them is a very large number. But in the budgeting 
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process, the Congress at some point votes a lid-let's be generous 
and say $700 billion a year for the compliance costs of government 
regulation. Now that $700 billion doesn't show up in the federal 
budget. It shows up initially in the budgets of the organizations-
whether it's Washington University or McDonnell Douglas-that 
are complying with the government regulation. But ultimately it 
shows up in the prices of all the goods and services consumers buy. 
How to administer that $700 billion ceiling each year? Very 
simply, in concept. Each agency comes in with its regulatory pro-
grams, and sure enough, they come in with more than $700 bil-
lion. I grew up in the old budget bureau, so government budgeting 
is something I do know something about. They come in predictably 
with more than $700 billion of compliance costs of regulation, and 
therefore, the government is forced to set priorities: Which are the 
most productive, effective government regulatory programs? Let's 
assure them a place in the budget, and the ones that aren't worth 
it, that aren't cost effective, that would flunk the simplest benefit-
cost test, let's cut them back. And that $700 billion lid, or wherever 
you draw the line, would force that priority process that is absent 
from the regulatory regime at the present time. Will a regulatory 
budget work perfectly? No, but I'm tempted to say anything would be 
better than the chaotic status quo. 
Foreman: What is the compliance cost for sugar price sup-
ports? If you've got that in a regulatory budget, you can bet that the 
same people who have been so effective in maintaining sugar price 
supports long after there was any justification for them, if there 
ever was, will end up wlth their piece of a federal regulatory budget. 
And changes that need to be made in worker safety and civil rights 
are likely to get squeezed out because the lobby supporting them 
has less money for campaign contributions. 
Weidenbaum: No, Carol. There is a little problem with what 
you said, and that little problem is you're describing a boondoggle 
subsidy program, and subsidies by definition are in the federal bud-
get to begin with. So there's no opportunity or need or reason for 
putting them into the regulatory budget. 
Summations 
Weldon: Well, I hate to interrupt, but we need to give our two 
debaters some time for summations. We could go on for another 
hour at least, and I know you're all enjoying it. But I also know you 
probably have places that you've got to be. So at the risk of leaving 
you disgruntled because I didn't allow more time for questions, I'm 
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going to ask Murray to go first with his summation. It sounds as 
though these two debaters won't agree on anything, but I have a 
feeling we will probably find some sources of agreement. Murray? 
Weidenbaum: I'd like to offer four specific approaches for im-
proving the status quo in government regulation. 
1. Policy reform should start with the lightest touch-require 
economic impact statements before issuing a regulation. This is a 
close cousin to the existing environmental impact statements. Just 
make sure that regulatory decision makers know the economic 
consequences of their actions before they act. This may include 
identifying and analyzing advantages and disadvantages-but does 
not extend to performing a formal benefit -cost analysis. 
2. The next step is to estimate the benefits and costs to see if 
the benefits justify the costs (not that they necessarily have to be 
greater). In that spirit, President Carter required regulatory agen-
cies to compare costs and benefits before they issued a new regula-
tion. President Clinton has taken the same position. However, the 
Carter people took this requirement seriously. The General Ac-
counting Office reports that most regulatory agencies ignore the 
Clinton executive order. 
Perhaps at times the answer is to give the private sector 
the benefit of the doubt: if Congress can't write a sen-
sible regulatory law, it should hold off adding to the 
clutter on the statute books. 
-Weidenbaum 
3. An approach with more teeth is to require each new regula-
tion to pass a formal benefit-cost test. President Reagan required 
new regulations to take such a benefit-cost test, except where the 
law prevented it. It turns out that the statutory exceptions are nu-
merous. These include specific statutes such as the Clean Air Act 
and the so-called independent regulatory agencies-FCC, lTC, 
NRC, FERC, and NLRB. Yes, it will take a new law to remedy this 
deficiency. 
4. A regulatory budget is yet another way of controlling regula-
tory costs. This would be a ceiling on the high costs that regulators 
impose on the private sector-compliance costs now run in the 
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hundreds of billions of dollars a year. This is not a recipe for rigid-
ity. New priorities could replace old within the overall budget ceiling. 
Perhaps at times the answer is to give the private sector the 
benefit of the doubt: if Congress can't write a sensible regulatory 
law it should hold off adding to the clutter on the statute books. 
Exi~ting regulatory statutes already fill up a good-sized library. Like-
wise, if a regulatory agency is unable to issue a work~ble regula-
tion it should restrain its normal impulse to expand Its realm of 
activity. More is not always better than less. . . 
The experience of the Interstate Commerce Commission 
provides a pertinent case in point. A few years ag~, ~ongress 
decided to close down this oldest of regulatory commisswns. The 
demise of the ICC goes unmourned. Nobody misses it! What a 
great precedent. . 
Foreman: I seem to recall that it was Jimmy Carter who first 
proposed getting rid of the ICC and. I again ~ant to differentiate 
between economic regulation and social regulation, because Murray 
cites economic, but his goal is to go after social regulation. 
Those of us who support government regulation to protect such 
values as health the environment, and civil rights have an obliga-
tion to make su;e that regulation is as rational, effective, and effi-
cient as possible and generates the fewest possible uni~tended 
negative consequences. We are obliged to seek ways to Improve 
both the process and the product. . . 
I have five recommendations for improving regulatwn. 
First we should join forces to insist that Congress take re-
sponsibili~y for its role in regulation. It's hard to write good regula-
tions implementing a law that has been rendered hopelessly vague 
and confused by changes made to buy a vote here or there. Co.n-
gress rarely sets specific time limi~s on new regulatory authonty 
or establishes deadlines for regulations to be completed. Congress 
rarely conducts regular and detailed oversight of regulatory age~­
cies. Pushing Congress in this direction would be a worthwhile 
investment of corporate influence. 
Second, Congress and regulators need access to independen~, 
high-quality scientific analysis. Congress h~s independe~t . au~l­
tors and budget analysts, but, in a world dnven by. sophisticated 
science, Congress has no capacity to an~l~ze the science underly-
ing demands for legislative action. At a minimum, Congress should 
reinstate the Office of Technology Assessment. 
Regulatory agencies need more and b~tter scientists to re-
view and evaluate industry data and some Independent rese~rch 
capacity. They should not have to rely completely on data provided 
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by interested parties. Instead of cutting agency budgets, regulated 
industries should lobby to improve their scientific capacity. 
The regulatory process would also be improved by a mecha-
nism that outlines the most pressing scientific issues in a field 
and generates an independent scientific analysis of the options for 
addressing it. The Health Effects Institute set up under the Clean 
Air Act has helped develop better regulation. This independent or-
ganization funded by both the auto industry and EPA used indepen-
dent panels of scientists and peer reviewers to determine the key 
scientific issues on the best way to deal with air pollution caused 
by gasoline fumes at service stations. EPA was able to make a 
decision based on scientific data that were accepted by both in-
dustry and government. 
Third, I support rules that embrace regulatory performance 
standards and establish financial incentives that reward positive 
behavior. 
Those of us who support government regulation to 
protect such values as health, the environment, and civil 
rights have an obligation to make sure that regulation is 
as rational, effective, and efficient as possible. 
-Foreman 
Fourth, I support some form of negotiated rule making that 
brings the stakeholders and regulators together as early in the 
process as possible and emphasizes a cooperative rather than an 
adversarial procedure. 
Fifth, I support risk assessment, risk analysis, economic 
impact statements and regulatory impact analyses. I oppose re-
quiring cost-benefit analysis in social regulation and establish-
ing a regulatory budget. Cost-benefit analysis is not either 
well-developed as a tool nor particularly useful in analyzing hu-
man and aesthetic factors. 
Finally, in a recent study, Professor Weidenbaum referred to 
the lack of trust that hampers rational decision making. I agree with 
him. Effective representative government requires a modicum of trust 
among the participants. Without it, the best data are useless. It is 
unlikely that we'll see any improvement in substance or process until 
we restore some level of trust and civility to the dialogue. 
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Weldon: Thank you to both of our debaters for a very interest-
ing afternoon. I think we can find some points of agreement. They 
may beat me up afterwards if I say they've agreed on something 
and they haven't, but we are very civil here. 
I think there's a possibility that Carol might agree with Murray 
on starting with a light touch by requiring economic impact state-
ments at least, without a formal cost-benefit analysis. There is no 
doubt about the fact that Carol opposes a regulatory budget and 
Murray is for it. However, I think they both would agree that it's 
critically important that Congress be persuaded to write better laws 
and exercise more discipline as it writes the laws. I think that both 
of them would cite the OSHA law as one that basically says ''We can't 
figure this out. Let the regulators do it." And that's what happened .. 
I think probably that Murray would agree that a sunset proVI-
sion on regulatory laws would be a good idea. It would be a way of 
weeding out some that didn't work-the air bag example, for in-
stance. I think when that regulation was put in place, everyone 
thought it was great. No one realized that there might be some 
potential injuries that might result. 
Carol has indicated a need for a better science base, and I 
think Murray would definitely agree with that, although I'm .not 
sure he would feel that the agencies need more staff. He m1ght 
suggest that the agencies find ways to increas~ ~heir staff of sci-
ence-based regulators by eliminating other pos1t1ons. 
Certainly I think that as we move into a more technological 
world, a complex world of biology and genomics, for examp~e, there 
is going to be unlimited demand from t~e peopl~ and t~e1r repre-
sentatives in Washington to write legislat10n that 1ncreas1ngly rules 
how we will live our lives. And I'm thinking in particular about the 
debate on the ethics of stem-cell development that may result in 
the growth of replacement organs as just one example. . 
I think that Murray and Carol would also agree that there 1s a 
lack of trust and that something needs to be done to build that 
trust. We've shown a good example of trust-building this afternoon: 
two very intelligent people who come from different parts of t?e 
political spectrum have come together, have had a reasona~le dls-
cussion and have entertained you all for an hour and 15 m1nutes. 
1 hope ;ou've enjoyed this debate. Thank you all for coming. 
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